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MICHIGAN 
LAW REVIEW 
VoL. XIX. JANUARY, 1921 No. 3 
THE SUSPENSION OF THE ABSOLUTE POWER 
OF ALIENATION. 
I N his N:A'l'URE AND SouRc~s oF LAW, John Chipman Gray says, , "The Common Law has often been reproached with the lack of 
precision and certainty in its definitions, 'but, in truth, it is a great 
advantage of the Common Law, and of the mode of its development 
by judicial decision, that its definitions are never the matt.ers re-
solved by the cases; they are never anything but dicta. If at the 
end of the sixteenth, or of the ~eventeenth, or even of the eighteenth · 
century, there had been definitions binding by statute op, the Courts; 
if the meaning of 'contract', and 'malice', and ·'possession', and 'per-
petuities' had been fixed, what fetters would have been imposed on 
the natural development of the Law. And it is the great disadvan-
tage of a code, that practising lawyers and jurists alike are hampered 
by the cast-iron classification and definitions of a former generation, 
which, in the advancement of legal thought and knowledge, are now 
felt to be imperfect and im:~dequate."1 Confining the illustration to 
the word 'perpetuities' the above quotation is so apt to the purpose 
of this article that it may well serve as a text for it. 
By statute adopted in 1828, taking effect in 1830, New York at-
tempted a legislative definition of perpetuity.2 This definition has 
been adopted, directly or remotely, in whole or in part, by many other 
states.3 It was a pr~ature attempt at definition, ~d it is intended 
1 GRAY, Tm: NA~ A~ SoURhs oF 1'H£ LAw, Ch. I, Sec. 16. 
• R. S., pt. 2, c. l, tit. 2, Secs. 14, 15, and 16. , 
• Arizona-Rsv. STS. OF 1913, CIVIJ, Cont, Secs. 467g-4681 .. 
Califomia-CIVIJ, Cont, Secs. 715, 716, 772. 
Idaho-I REv. Conts, Secs. 3o67, 3072. 
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here to point out some of the anomalies and inconsistencies which 
have resulted from it. 
Professor Gray states the Rule again Perpetuities as follows: "No 
interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-
one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest."' 
Independent of statutory modification this would now generally be 
conceded as an accurate general statement of the rule.11 From this 
it appears that only non-vested interests can come within the pro-
hibition of the rule. All present interests are vested. Accordingly 
neither present estates, nor vested future estates ever come within 
the operation of the Rule against Perpetuities, whether alienable or 
inalienable. a 
Serious question has, however, been raised as to whether 'or not 
all future non-vested, or contii:tgent interests, are subject to the rule, 
it being contended that no alienable interest, even though future and 
contingent, is within the policy that the·rule is intended.to subseive~7 
Indiana~ BuRNS' ANN. STs., Sec. 3998. 
Iowa-Com: o:it 1897, Sec. 2901. 
Kentucky-I KY. STS. (1915), Sec. 236o. 
Michigan-Hown.L's STs. [2nd ed.], Secs. 1o636-1o638. 
Mfonesota-Gr:N-. STs. (1913), Secs. 6664-6666. 
North Dakota-CoMPII.W LAWS (1913), Secs. 5287, 5315. 
Oklahoma-R:i;:v. LAWS (I9Io), Secs. 66o5, 66o8. 
South Dakota-2 CoMPILJ>D LAWS (I9I3), CIVIL Conr:, Secs. 224, 2.52. 
Wisconsin-WIS. STs., Secs. 2038-2040. 
Statutes relating to accumulations and statutes relating to personal prop-
erty only are not included in the above references. 
•GRAY, Rur.:i;: AGAINST Pr:RP:i;:TUITI:i;:s, [3rd ed.], Sec. 20I. 
•London & S. W. Ry. Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. Div. 562; In re Trustees of 
Hollis' Hospital, L. R. [1899], .2 Ch. 540; In re Ashforth, L. R. [19051, I Ch. 
535; Matter of Wilcox, 194 ~. Y. 288, 296; Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362; 
SANDERS, Usr:s AND TRusTS, [4th ed.], Vol. I, p. Ig6; Lr:wxs, P:i;:RPr:TmTxr:s, 
pp. 163, I64- See, however, CHAU.IS, RF.AI. PRoPF.RTY, [3rd ed.], p. 18o. Also 
KAI.r:s, "PRom.Dfs o'it GRAv's. Rur.r: AGAINST Pr:RPttUITxr:s," 20 HARV. L. Rr:v. 
I~I- · 
•Gray points out in his perpetuities, (3rd ed., Secs. 234-236), that some 
American cases are not in strict accord with the statement above made, but 
they are not in ·harmony with either, the weight of authority, or fundamental 
theory. . . 
• ~s, ~ PRoPeRTY, Vol. II, Secs. 956-g59; Fowu:R, PF.RSONAL 
PROPERTY LAW oF TH:i;: STAtt OF Nr:w YoRK, [2nd ed.], pp. 329-331; FoWLr:R, 
~ PRoPr:RTY LAw OF Tm: STATr: o:it Nr:w You:, [3rd ed.], pp. 270-276. 
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'this has been approved and acted upon in decision.8 Even Profes-
sor Gray, though arguing for the reasonableness of the extension of 
the rule tq futu~e contingent alienable interests, said, "Since the 
original purpose of the Rule against Perpetuities was to restrain 
one mode of tying up estates, it would not have been inconsistent 
with that purpose to have held that contingent interests, if alienable, 
did not come within the Rule, but, as will appear in this chapter, 
the Rule has been extended so as to cover all futur,e interests whether 
alienable or not, and this extension, though not a logically necessary 
consequence of the establishment of the rule, is now well settled, and 
it· is a reasonable extension."0 The decisions referred to have been 
overruled,1° and it is believed·that this is "a logically necessary con-
sequence" of the policy directing the establishment of the rule. 
Let us examine that policy for a moment. Professor Gray has 
said, as others have said, "The policy of the law is that property 
should not he taken out o.f commerce."11 Unfortunately this tells 
us little. The word 'commerce' as used in connection with chattels 
personal ordinarily implies both the exchange in legal rights and the 
physical transportation of the chattels. The latter sense is that which 
is stressed when the desirability of commerce is urged. But phy-
sical transportation of the subject matter of property in land can 
occur if at all only within insignificant limits. The only 'commerce' 
of any extent that can occur in connection with such property con-
sists in the ex~hange of legal rights. And since it is in connection 
with interests in land that the Rule against Perpe_tuities, though 
applicable to chattels personal, is most frequently applied, it is the 
•See cases referred to and discussed in GRAy's PERPtTUIT!ES, [3rd ed.], 
Ch. VII. 
9 GRAY, Ruu: AGAINST PSRPtTUITits, [3rd ed.], Sec. 268. See also Sec. 
278 where he says, "To subject future contingent interests presently alienable 
to the Rule against Perpetuities is an extension of the Rule beyond the needs 
which gave.it birth." However, in an article entitled, "Remoteness of Chari-
table Gifts,'' 7 HARV. L. R.mr. 406, 410, he answers the following question in 
favor of the second alternative, "Is a remote future interest objectionable only 
· because for too long a period there may be no one who can give a good title; 
or is it objectionable also because the policy of the law does not allow in-
terests so uncertain in value to hamper a present ownership?" See also Ruu: 
AGAINST PtRPimJ1ms, [3rd ed.], Sec. 6o3 £. 
10 GRAY, Ruu~ AGAINST PSRPt>rUITits, [3rd ed.], Secs. 275-277. 
11 Ruu: AGAINST ~1ms, [3rd ed.], Sec. 6oaa. 
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desirability of commerce in property in land that has been in the 
minds of those engaged in working out the Rule. 
The Rule against -Perpetuities is a rule of policy founded upon-
some supposed public benefit justifying, in the cases coming within 
its scope, the thwarting of an individual desire. What public benefit 
can result from the exchange of legal rights or interests in land? 
Undoubtedly the chief benefit consists in the resulting greater utiliza-
tion of the subject matter of such property.12 What cbnditions are 
essential to the procuring of a high degree of utilization of land? 
Certainly one essential condition is possession by one whose tenure 
is reasonably free from hazards beyond his control. Efficient use 
of land may require a permanent investment of capital which will 
not be made by one who is uncertain of his tenure. Another essen-
tial condition is the ability of the possessor to place another with 
like permanency of tenure on the land in his stead. For many 
reasons it may be impossible for the one in possession of land to be 
able to use it to advantage. In order that such land may be used 
to capacity, he should be able to dispose of it to another who can. 
In other words, to secure a high degree of utilization of land, it 
should be possessed by those having an assured interest with free-
dom to use at their discretion coupled with the power to convey to 
others a like interest. This ideal the law has with rare exception 
attemped to secure. 
This condition may be, however, by no means desirable in the 
view of the creator or grantor of the estate in possession. For 
various reasons he may wish to impose his will upon the possessor 
in such a way as to lessen the security of his possession, and to re-
strict his freedom of use and disposition. The law has refused to 
permit him to do this except by the creation of a future interest in 
some form.13 The power to create future interests of certain kinds 
having been recognized in the creator and grantors of estates in 
12 There are possible social interests to be furthered by such freedom of 
alienation, such as securing a wider distribution of the ownership of land, 
but it is ·believed that such interests have had, as compared with those re-
ferred to in the text, relatively little influence upon the development of 
the Rule. 
13 Exceptions to the statement· of the text exist in the case of the separate 
estates of married women, and in the case of spendthrift trusts where 
recognized. 
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p9ssession, the question becomes, what limitations will be placed 
upo~ the power in the interest of the ideal referred to above? 
The limitations eventually imposed were the rules against re-· 
straints ~n alienation arid th~ Rule against Perpetuities.u The rules· 
against restraints an alienation and the Rule against Perpetuities 
alike operate by declaring void future interests because of their 
tendency to inter£ ere with the freedom of the owner of the estate 
in possession. The former are directed against future interests, the 
object of whose creation is the prevention of the exercise by· the 
o~ner of the preceding estate of his power of alienation.111 The Rule 
against Perpetuities is directed against future interests without re-
gard to the object of their creation. But its object is, as is the object 
of the rules against restraints on alienation, to promote the utiliza-
tion of land by offering security in possession and freedom of use 
and disposition, to the ow~er of the present estate. 
A brief review of the course of decision will show the relationship 
between the rules against restraints on· alienation and the Rule 
against Peryetuities. By the fifteenth century at least it had been 
held that a condition or limitation intended to restrain the alienation 
of a fee .simple by the owner of it was void.16 At about the same 
time the courts were seeking to remove the restrictions placed on the 
owner of the present estate by the Statute De Donis. They eventu-
ally held that the tenant in tail could bar the heirs tail and the re-
versioners and remaindermen of the rights guaranteed them by De 
Donis by suffering a common recovery.17 When it _had once been 
held that an entail could be disentailed in a certain manner, condi-
tions against disentailing in that manner began to be imposed upon 
grants of such estates. Though conditions against alienation of fees 
tail had been sustained previously as in accord with the policy of 
De Donis, when the policy of that statute was reversed by the courts 
"GRAY, RULE AGAINST I'tRPETUITIES, [3rd ed.], Sec. 603a. 
11 The r-ules against restraints on alienation are, of course, wider in their 
scope than is here indicated. They operate to render void direct attempts by 
the grantors of estates to render them inalienable by withholding from the 
· grantees the powers of alienation they would otherwise have, as well as in-
direct attempts to accomplish the same result by imposing a gift over in the 
form of a future interest to a third person as a penalty. It is the latter effect 
of such rules that is referred to in the text. 
,..GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, [2nd ed.], Sec. 19. 
•t DIGBY, HISTORY OF THE ·LAW OF fuAI. PROPERTY, [5th ~d.], pp. 249-258.. 
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by the approval of disentailing devices in the form of fines and 
common recoveries the courts began to frown upon efforts of 
creators of estates to create unbarrable entails. Accordingly condi-
. tions against suffering a common recovery or levying a fine were 
declared void.18 Such conditions were called perpetuities, and tl> 
them the word perpetuity owes one of its first applications in 
our law.19 
Such conditions are restraints on alienation in the modem sense. 
In applying the word 'perpetuities' to them, emphasis is undoubtedly 
placed upon the condition which would result if they were sustained, 
and if they should accomplish their purpose. This result would be to 
secure a fixed devolution of the property regardless of the wishes 
of the successive owners subsequent to the creator of the estate tail. 
That fixed devolution was undoubtedly in the minds of the courts 
when they used the term 'perpetuity.' But the reason they objected 
to this fixed devolution was for the same reason that they objected to 
other conditions or limitations restrairiing the alienation of estates 
in land, i. e. their tendency to interfere with use and disposition by 
the owner of the estate in possession. 
At about the same time this attempt to revive the unbarrable entail 
was being frustrated, there was tried the expedient of creating par-
ticular estates for life in the first taker with remainder in tail. Since 
these remainders were usually to unborn persons, they were usually 
contingent. Because contingent common law remainders were de-
structible by the owner of the estate in possession, the life estate and 
remainders were created in use to be executed by the Statute of Uses 
in hopes that contingent remainders so created would be held in-
destructible. This device was also called a perpetuity.20 
It was held, however, that even though created through the opera-
tion of the Statute of Uses, contingent remainders were destructible 
by the life tenant.21 Hence this device proved unsuccessful. Not, 
it will be noted, by declaring the future interest void in the first in-
stance, but by subjecting it to the control of the owner of the estate 
in possession. 
18 Corbet's Case, I Co. 83b; BACON, Uss ol? 'rHE LAW, Law Tracts, 145; 
GRAY, Rss'rRAIN'rS ON AL!ENA'rION, [2nd ed.], Secs. 75-77; GRAY, Ruu: AGAJnS'r 
P$PE'tUI'rlES, [3rd ed.], Secs. 141a-141c. 
"GRAY, Rur.E AGAINS'r PERPE'rUI'r!ES, {3rd ed.], Sec. 141e. 
11 GRAY, Rur.i;: AGAINST PERPETUITIES, [3rd ed.], Sec. 141c. 
"'Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. 120a. 
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But while contingent remainders even though created by way of 
use had been held to be destructible, it was shortly held that spring-
ing and shifting uses and executory devises were not destructible by 
act of the ··owner of th.e estate in possession.22 Here, then, were 
interests .that obviously should be controlled in some way. The 
method of control was eventually laid down by Lord Nottingham in 
the Duke of Norfolk's Case.23 It was that springing and shifting 
uses, and executory devises must be so limited that the contingency 
upon which they were limited must occur within ·a time which was 
not so remote as to cause any inconvenience. The inconvenience 
meant is undoubtedly that of the owner of the estate in possession, 
or perhaps, rather, through him, that of the public, for Lord Not-
tingham, when asked where he would stop in permitting these in-
terests to be limited in the future, answered that he would stop when 
any visible inconvenience occurred, where there was any danger of 
a 'perpetuity.' Naturally. enough, however, he did not use 'per-
petuity' in the modern sense of a future interest which may not vest 
within the time permitted by the rule.24 The definition in this sense 
presupposes the existence of the Rule. But Lord Nottingham was 
using the term 'perpetuity' in the sense, or in one of the senses, in 
which it had previously been used. He said : "A perpetuity is the 
settlement of an estate or an interest in tail, with such remainders 
expectant upon it, as are in no sort in the power of the tenant in tail 
in possession, to dock by any recovery or assignment, but such re-
mainders must continue as perpetual clogs upon the estate."25 The 
sense in which he used the term 'perpetuity' shows that he had in 
mind in formulating his Rule against Perpetuities the inconvenience 
in permitting to exist for too long a time an indestructible interest. 
Since the rule as so developed is limited to regulating future in-
terests according to their remoteness of vesting it might appropri-
ately have been called the Rule against Remoteness of Vesting.20 
For the same reason, however, that the devices previously ref erred 
to were called 'perpetuities', i. e. that they procured or attempted to 
'"Manning's Case, 8 Co. 94b; Lampet's Case, IO Co. 46b; Pelis v. Brown, 
Cro. Jae. 590 • 
... 3 Ch. Cas. I • 
.. LEWIS, ~TUITY, 164-
.. Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. I. 
"'GRAY, Rur,E AGAINST PERP£TU1ms, [3rd ed.], Sec. 2; JARMAN, Wn.I.s, 
[7th ed.], Vol. I, p. 296, note v. 
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procure a fi...xed devolution of property, it was called the Rule against 
Perpetuities. But, since an attempt to create a 'perpetuity' may be 
controlled by oth~r rules as well as by, or instead of, the Rule against 
Perpetuities, confusion with such rules has been caused by the use 
of the phrase 'Rule against Perpetuities'. 
Thus there should never have been any doubt but that the applica-
tion of the rule was not affected by the alienability of the future in-
terest. An alienable future interest is only slightly less objectionable 
from the point of view of the owner of the present estate than an 
inalienable one. This has always been recognized in the application 
of the. rules against restraints on alienation. Thus, in case a grant 
is made to A and his heirs, but in case he or they should attempt to 
alien the estate, then to B and his heirs, the gift to B is none the less 
void as an improper restraint on alienation though B can convey his 
Interest, or though A and B can jointly convey an estate in possession 
free from a future interest. The law h31s very sensibly placed less 
importance upon the fact that they can alienate than upon the fact 
that they probably will not. Of course, it is the latter fact that is 
relied upon to make the device effective. Yet doubt has been enter-
tained as to whether an alienable future interest comes within the 
operation of the Rule against Perpetuities. It is believed that that 
doubt would have been much less apt to arise had the rule been called 
from the beginning the Rule against Remoteness of Vesting.21 
Also had it ·been called the Rule against Remoteness of Vesting 
there could never have arisen any question of its application to pres-
ent estates. As it is, it has sometimes mistakenly been applied to 
such interests.28 
Had it been so called, it is clear that the revisors of the New York 
statutes would have framed their definition very differently, fol', 
although it is now said that the rule against suspension of the power 
of alienation now appearing in the statutes of New York and of the 
states which have adopted the definition of those statutes is very 
rr "It ought to have been called the Rule again Remoteness; in the old 
books 'perpetuity' means an inalienable interest and (more especially) a dis-
position by which land is settled on unborn descendents ad infinitum, so as 
to be inalienable. The two id'eas of 'remoteness' and 'perpetuity' are con-
stantly confused at the present day." Charles Sweet: "The Monstrous Regi-
ment of the Rule against Perpetuities," 18 JURIDICAL Rtvn:w, 132, n. (a). 
28 GRAY, Rur.E AGAINST PJUU>in'UI'l'ml>, [3rd ed.]; Secs. 234-246. 
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di.fferent from the common law Rule against Perpetuities,20 there is 
no reason to suppose that the revisors intended to alter the funda-
mentals of that rule.30 
They submitted to the I~gislature, in the first instance, certain 
sections as follows : 
Sec. 14. Every future estate shall be void in its creation, 
which shall suspend the absolute power of alienation for a 
longer period than is prescribed in this Article. Such power 
of alienation is suspended, when there are no persons in 
being, by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed. 
Sec. 15. The absolute power of alienation shall not be sus-
pended by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer 
period than during the continuance and until the termination 
of a life, or lives in being at the creation of the estate, except 
in the.single case mentioned in the next section. 
Sec. 16. A contingent remainder in fee may be created on 
a prior remainder in fee to take effect in the event that the 
persons to whom the first remainder is limited, shall die under 
the age of twenty-one years, or upon any other contingency, 
by which the estate of such persons may be determined be-
fore they attain their age. 
Sec. 17. In every creation of a future estate, the absolute 
power of alienation shall not be suspended longer than the 
lives of two persons then in being. 
Sec. 18. Successive estates for life shall not be limited 
unless to persons in being at the creation thereof; and where 
a remainder shall be limited on more than two successive 
estates for life, all the life estates subsequent to those of the 
two persons first entitled thereto, shall be void, and upon the 
"Matter of Wilcox, 194 N. Y. 288, 296 . 
.. The object of the revisers is thus stated by themselves, "It is to abolish 
all technical rules and distinctions, having no relation to the essential nature 
of property and the means of its beneficial enjoyment, but which, derived 
from the feudal system, rest solely upon feudal reasons; to define with pre-
cision the limits within which the power of alienation may be suspended by 
the erection of contingent estates, and ·to reduce all expectant estates sub-
stantially to the same class, and apply to them the same rules whether created 
by deed or devise." 3 N. Y. R. S. [2nd ed.], p. 571. 
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death of .those persons, the remainaer shall take effect, in the 
same manneras if no other life estates had been created.81 
In th.eir notes to these sections the revisers said: 
"The difference between the preceding sections and the 
existing law, consists in the following particulars: 
I. Alienafion can not be protracted by mere nominees un-
connected with the estate, beyond the period of two lives. 
2. No more than two successive estates for life can be 
created. 
3. The period of twenty-one years, after a life or lives in 
being, is no 1onger allowed as an absolute term; but the rule 
is restored to its original object, by being confined to the case 
of actual infancy, which is directly provided for by rendering 
the cdisposition defeasible, and allowing another to be substi-
tuted durin_g the_period."32 
~rom this it seems clear, as said before, that there was no inten-
·tion on the part of the revisers to change the fundamentals of the 
;Rule against Perpetuities. How clearly they comprehended those 
fundamentals is not certain, however. It is likely that they more or 
less clearly conceived it as a rule against remoteness of vesting, but 
failed to comprehend that an alienable· future interest is nearly if 
not quite as obnoxious to the rule as an inalienable one. Thus 
they say: 
"To prevent a possible difficulty in the minds of those to 
whom the subject is not familiar, we may also add, that an 
estate is never inalienable, unless there is a contingent re-
mainder, and the contingency has not yet occurred. Where 
the remainder is vested, as where the lands are given to A for 
life, remainder to B (a person then in being) in fee, there 
is no suspense of the power of alienation; for the remainder-
man and the owner of the prior estate, by uniting, may always 
convey the whole estate. This is the meaning of the rule of 
law prohibiting per2etuities, and is the effect of the definition 
in Sec. 14:"33 
u See N. Y. R. S. [:znd ed.], p. 570. 
12 3 N. Y. R S. [:znd. ed.], p. 572 • 
.. 3 N. Y. R. S. [2nd ed.], p. 573. 
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. These sections were adopted by the legislature substantially as 
proposed with the important exception that in section 15 the words 
"of not more than two" were substituted for the words "and until 
the termination of a life, ·or" so that the section as enacted read: 
"The ab5olute power of alienation, shall not be suspended by any 
limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than during the 
continuance of not more than two lives in being at the creation of 
the estate, except in the single case mentioned in tP,e next section" ;34 
and section 17 was omitted. The change in section 15 was made at 
the suggestion of the revisers and section 17 omitted on their further 
suggestion that it would be rendered unnecessary by the correction 
in section 15.35 
The importance of these changes consists in this : Ha~ sections 14 
and 15 been proposed in the form enacted it might plausibly have 
been argued that section 15 did nothing more than prescribe the 
period beyond which alienation might not be suspended while the 
test of what constitutes a suspension was to be found in section 14. 
Further it could be argued that tinder section 14 the only suspension 
provided against is that caused by future estates.36 
u IN: Y. R. S., p. 723, Sec. 15 . 
.. 3 N. Y. R. S. [2nd ed.], p. 570, Secs. IS and 17 . 
.. In 18g6 the Real property Law of the State of New York was subjected 
to a new revision. In this revision sections 14 15, and 16 of Art. I. Tit .. II, 
Ch. I, Pt. II, of the Rms<:D STATUTES were consolidated so as to read as fol-
lows: "The absolute power of alienation is suspended, when there are no 
persons in being by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed. 
Every future estate shall be void in its creation, which shall suspend the 
absolute power of alienation, by any limitation or condition whatever, for a 
longer period than during the continuance of not more •than two lives in being 
at the creation of the estate; except that a contingent remainder in fee may 
be created on a prior remainder in fee, to take effect in the event that the 
persons to whom the first remainder is limited, die under the age of twenty-
one years, or on any other contingency by which the estate of such person 
may be determined before they attain full age. For the purposes of this sec-
tion, a minority is deemed a part of a life, and not an absolute term equal to 
the possible duration of such minority." Sec. 32 of the RtAI, PRoPlffi'l'Y LAW 
· oF 18¢, Sec. 32, Ch. XLVI, of G1m:ERAL LAws. In the report to the legisla-
ture of the Commissioners on· Statutory Revision who prepared this revision 
it is said with reference to this section that it is sections 14, 15, and 16 "un-
changed in substance, except that the last sentence, which is declaratory of 
existing law, is new." FowL!lR's RtAL PROP!>R'l'Y LAW OF THE STAT!l OF NEW 
YORK, [3rd ed.], p. 1209. Despite the statement that this. s~ction leaves the 
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As will appear later this was actually argued and, had it not been 
for prqof of the form in which the statutes were originally proposed, 
the argument might have been successful. 
Let us see what has been the course of decision. For the sake of 
convenience, the discussion will cover, first, present interests; sec-
ond, future interests. 
To a proper understanding of the application of the legislation 
previously quoted to present interests, it is necessary to. refer briefly 
to the regulations provided in the New York Revised Statutes on 
the subject of trusts. 
The revisers in the rules submitted. regulating trusts were inspired 
by the following considerations: They seemed to feel that much of 
the complexity of .the law of real property and the uncertainty of 
titles was caused by the separation of the legal and equitable 
estates.37 They proposed a system which, in their words, "will sweep 
away an immense mass of useless refinements and distinctions; will 
relieve the law of real property to a great extent, from its abstruse-
ness and uncertainty, and render it, as a system, intelligible and 
consistent; that the security of creditors and purchasers will be in-
creased; the investigation of titles much facilitated; the n~eans of 
alienation be rendered far more simple and less expensive, and final-
ly, that numerous sources of vexatious litigation will be perpetually 
closed."38 
They proposed to accomplish these results by abolishing passive 
uses and trusts by more thoroughgoing legislation than the original 
former sections unchanged in substance, had the original legislation been pro-
posed and enacted in this form, it could hardly have been interpreted as 
applying to any interests other than future estates, an interpretation, of course, 
much narrower than was given to the sections as they were actually enacted. 
See CHAPI.IN's SUSPENSION oit THE Powa OF .Al.ISNATION [2nd ed.], pp. 134, 
135. FowLtt's REAL PROPERTY LAW oi,· THE STATE oF NEw YoRK, [3rd ed.], 
pp. 262, II67. It, however, seems to be accepted by the courts as the commis-
sioners evidently intended it to be. Herzog v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 
177 N. Y. 86, 69 N. E. 283; Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Kip, 120 App. Div. 
347, 104 N. Y. S. 1o92; Bindrim v. Ulrich, 64 App. Div. 444. 72 N. Y. S. 239; 
Union Trust Co. v. Metcalf, 37 Misc. 672, 76 N. Y. S. 375; Allen v. Litchard, 
93 Mis. 197, 157 N. Y. S. 19; In re Ward's Bsµte, 175 N. Y :S. 654; In re 
Abbey, 168 N. Y. S. 1047, 181 App. Div. 395, affirming decree in 164 N. Y. S. 
934, g8 Misc. 5o6. 
81 Revisers' Reports and Notes, 3 N. Y. R. S., [2nd ed.], pp. 579-54 
as Ibid, p. 584. 
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Statute of Uses, and by allowing active trusts only within very nar-
row limits. The active trusts which they proposed to permit were 
the following : 
~' (I) To sell land.s for the benefits of creditors. 
( 2) To sell, mortgage or lease lands, for the benefit of 
legatees, or for the purpose of satisfying any charge thereon. 
(3) To receive the rents and profits of land, and apply 
them to the education and support, or support only of any 
person during the life of such person or for any shorter terms, 
subject to the rules prescribed in the first Article of the Title. 
(4) To receive the rents and profits of lands, and to 
accumulate the same, for the purposes and within the limits 
prescribed in the first Article of this Title."39 
Only the third class is of significance for the purposes of this dis-
cussion.40 The recommendation as to this class was adopted as pro-
posed with the exception that the words "or support only" were 
changed by the legislature to "or either."41 
Upon later recommendation by the revisers, the statute was 
amended in 1830 by striking out the words "education and support, 
or either-", and substituting the word "use".42 So that this provision 
then stood, "To receive the rents and profits of lands, and apply them 
to the use of any person, during the life of such person, or for any 
shorter term, subject to the rules prescribed in the first Article of 
this Title."43 
It was undoubtedly the expectation of the revisers that the au-
thority granted in this section would be exercised in general in the 
creation of trusts for the benefit of incompetents.u With this 
thought in mind they recommended, and the legislature enacted, the 
two following sections : 
.. Ibid, p. 579, note to Sec. 56 . 
.. The first two being trusts for alienation, a ·trust created under them 
could be deemed in no view of the statutes against suspension of alienation, 
to violate such statutes. Accumulations are regulated by provisions of the 
statutes other than the general statutes against the suspension of the power 
of alienation. I N. Y. R. S. 726, Secs. 37 and 38. 
41 Revisers' Reports and riotes, 3 N. Y. R. S., [2nd ed.], p. 578. 
••Ibid. 
"IN. Y. R. S., [2nd ed.], p. 723, Sec. 55 (3). 
"Revisers' Reports and Notes, 3 N. Y. RS., [2nd ed.], p. 585. 
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"Sec. 63. No person beneficially interested in a trust for 
the receipt of the rents and profits of lands can assign or in 
any manner dispose of such interest; but the rights and in-
terest of every person for whose benefit a trust for the pay-
ment of a sum in gross is created, are assignable. 
Sec. 65. Where the trust shall be expressed in the instru-
ment creating the estate, every sale, conveyance or other act 
of the trustees, in contravention of the trust, shall be abso-
lutely void."45 
The interest of a beneficiary of a trust for the receipt of the rents 
and profits of land is, under the first of these sections, made inalien-
able, even though not so intended by the creator of the trust. In 
fact, the creator of a trust under this section can not give to the 
cestui the power of alienation.4 a He may give to the trustee the 
power to convey. Except as he does. give such power, however, 
property held upon a trust for such purposes is completely in-
alienable. 
Though, as stated, it was expected by the revisers that the trust 
ordinarily to pe created under this section was a trust for incom-
petents, it was held that trusts for all persons competent or incom-
petent were permissible under it.47 We thus have a legislative com-
mand that aII trusts for the receipt of the rents and profits of land 
shall be what would now be called 'spendthrift' trusts, such command 
long antedating the development of the modem spendthrift trust 
doctrines. This legislation received a sympathetic consideration by 
the courts. To such an extent was this true that it was held that the 
rules there laid down should be applied by analogy to trusts for the 
receipt of the income of personal property.48 
The question of the application of the statutes against the suspen-
sion of the power of alienation to trusts of this character was the first 
"FOWLER'S !O;AL PROPERTY LA.w OF THI> STATJ> OF Ni;:w YoRK, [3rd ed.], 
p. 451. IN. Y. R. S., p. 730, Secs. 63 and 65 . 
.. Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265, 333 ; Crooke v. Kings County, 97 
N. Y. 421; CHAPI.IN, ExPRJ>ss TRUSTS AND PowERs, 379; 30 CYC. 1503, n. I. 
Compare FoWLER, REA!, PROPJ;;RTY LAW oF '!'HJ> S'l'A'l'I> OF Ni;:w YoRK, [3rd 
ed.], 500. 
"Fow~'s REA!, PRoPMTY LAw oF Ni;:w YoRK, [3rd ed.], 450-451; 
lh:sV1's, RJ,;AL PRoP$'l'Y, 497, 4g8; Liggett v. Perkins, 2 N. Y. 297, 3o8, 321, 325 . 
.. Fowr.u's PERSONAL PRoPi;:RTY LAW OF Ni;:w YoRK, [2nd ed.], p. 52. 
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question on the sections relating to real property in the New York 
Revised Statutes that came before the courts. This was in the well 
known case of Coster v. Lorillard.49 In this case a testator devised 
certain real estate to trus~ees, consisting of a brother and twelve 
nephews .and nieces, and to the survivor or survivors of them, in 
trust to receive the rents and profits and apply them to the use of the 
twelve nephews and nieces, in equal shares, during their joint lives, 
and to the survivor or survivors of them so long as any· of them 
should live, and to convey the remainder of the estate, after the 
death of all of such nephews and nieces, in fee to such of their 
descendents as should be then in existence. The will came before 
Vice-Chancellor McCown of the first circuit for construction. He 
held that, as to the trusts for the lives of the twelve nephews and 
nieces, it was good even though inalienable, for the reason that the 
statutes against suspension of the power of alienation applied only 
to suspension caused by future estates.50 The reasoning by which 
this result was reached was that previously suggested.u He de-
clined to make any decree as to the ultimate limitation over, ·because 
the proper parties were not before the court, but expressed the 
opinion that they were void as being too remote. 
On appeal to the court of chancery, all three of the revisers, But-
ler, Spencer, and Duer, appeared, each representing different inter-
ests. All contended that the devise for the lives of the twelve 
nephews and nieces was not rendered invalid by the statutes against 
suspension of the power of alienation; Butler,52 because such statutes 
affected only future estates ;53 Spencer, because, even if applicable 
to present interests, the restrictions on alienation in such cases as 
this, if any there were, were imposed by law, "and if not legal, they 
do not exist; and if legal, they must prevail" ; and because the "re-
striction is an incapacity in respect to the character of the party 
which is not engrafted on the estate."54 Duer, because the inca-
pacity to assign the beneficial interest in a trust for the receipt of the 
rents and profits and lands is personal and is not engrafted on the 
estate, the· true construction of the statute being that the beneficial 
., 5 Paige's Ch. 172, 14 Wend. 265. 
00 5 Paige's Ch. 172, l87-1g6. 
11 Supra, p. 249. 
11 With whom was associated Peter A. Jay. 
11 5 Paige's Ch. 172, 203-207. 
"'5 Paige's Ch. 172, 208-299. 
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interest is not per se assignable, ·but may be made assignable by the 
testator, and that it had here been made assignable.55 
"The Chancellor,56 however, held that the statutes applied to all 
.inalienable interests, whether present or future, and from whatever 
cause the inalienability arose. He held, however, that though the 
trust for the benefit of the nephews and nieces was subject to the· 
statutes, it was not void, as the trust, properly construed, created a 
tenancy in common, and as to the individual interest of each, there 
was not a suspension for a greater length of time than the statutes 
permitted.57 To the argument of the Vice-Chancellor that they pro-
hibited suspension by future estates only, he answered by showing 
the consolidation of the proposed sections IS and I7, drawing there-
irom the -conclusion that section IS should be construed as including 
the "interests intended to be covered by the two proposed sections, 
and in determining what interests were covered, he held as stated, 
that all inalienable interests were. . 
On appeal to the "Court of Errors similar arguments were repeated 
but the court held_that the estates created were joint estates, were 
inalienable for more than the period permitted by the statutes, and 
were void £or that reason.58 
Since the decision in this case it has been consistently held that 
trusl:s for the receipt of the rents and profits of land are subject to 
·the statutory rules against the suspension of the power of atiena-
tion.59 
Let us see what this means. The legislature has established the 
rule that trusts for the receipt of the rents and profits of 1and shall 
be inalienable. Because of the inalienability which has thus been 
.imposed upon the trust, it is declared to be void. Because of a 
quality annexed to his gift which he probably did not contemplate, 
.perhaps did not even desire, the wishes of the creator of the trust 
are frustrated, his cestuis disappointed, and his property distributed 
1111 5 Paige's Ch. r72, 2og-2r3 . 
.. Walworth. 
~ 5 Paige's Ch. r72, 2r3, 2x8. 
1111 I4 Wend. 265. 
'""Douglas v. Cruger, 8o N. Y. IS; Herzog v. Title Guarantee and Trust 
Company, I77 N. Y. 86; Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Kip, I92 N. Y. 266; 
In re Walkerly, 108 Cal. 627, 650, 41 Pac. 772, 776; Casgrain v. Hammond, I34 
Mich. 419, ¢ N. W. 510; Danforth v. Oshkosh, u9 Wis. 262, 97 N. W. 258; 
Rong v. Haller, rog Minn. 191, 123 N. W. 471; Penfield v. Tower, I N. D. 216. 
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among those whom he has indicated no desire to benefit. The law 
has been- rather over sensitive to thwarting the intention of the· 
creators o~ trusts. in the interests of the public, but if the legislature 
ever consciously contempla~ed such a result as that here indicated, 
it must be adjudged guilty of a wanton disregard of the intention of 
the creators of trusts and of the rights of their intended cestuis. 
The writer does not believe that the revisers or the legislature ever 
contemplated any such result. He believes that. the revisers when 
acting as counsel were not inconsistent with themselves as revisers 
in arguing that the statutes did not require any such result. Had 
tliey foreseen the judicial construction to be adopted, it seems in-
conceivable that they would have proposed any such legislation. 
As to the application of the statutory rule to future interests. It 
has been said repeatedly that the requirements of the statutory rule 
are satisfied if all having interests may convey by joint or several 
action in fee. simple.60 In 'other words, if each interest in the prop-
erty in question is by itself alienable, there is no violation of the 
statutory rule. 
Let us see how this works out in a concrete case. Take the case 
previously suggested. A grant is made of Blackacre to A and his 
heirs, with a proviso that if he or his heirs should ever alienate or 
attempt to alienate the same, it should go to B and his heirs. The 
conditional limitation to B would be void under the common law 
Rule against Perpet~ities because it might vest at a time later than 
permitted by the rule. It would also be void in the jurisdictions 
where the statutory nde against suspension of the power of aliena-
tion prevails because in violation of the mles against restraints on 
alienation as an improper restraint on the alienability of A's in-
terest. 61 But since A and B could by joint action at any time convey 
a fee simple, in possession, there would be no violation of the statutes 
against suspension of the power of alienation. 
The object of the statutory rule is said to be to keep real property 
. 
00 Graham v. Graham, 49 Misc. (N. Y.) 4, 97 N. Y. Suppl. 779; Becker 
v. Chester, II5 Wis. 90, 108, 91 N. W. 87; Buck v. Walker, n5 Minn. 239, 
132 N. W. 205; Fitzgerald v. City of Big Rapids, 123 Mich. 281, 283, 82 
N W.56. 
•
1 CHAPLIN, SusPtNSION OF THF: PowER oF ALIENATION, [2nd. ed.], Secs. 
129, 130; Greene v. Greene, 125 N. Y. 5o6, 512; Mandlebaum v. McDowell, 29 
~fich. 78, 18 Am. Rep. 61; Van Osdell v. Champion, 8g Wis. 661; Zillmer v • 
• andguth,. 94 Wis. 6o7. 
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in the channels of co~erce. 62 So vigorous has been the legislative 
mandate that this condition must prevail that we have seen that it 
is effective to render void because of inalienability an interest which 
had been rendered inalienable by another legislative mandate. Now 
we find it so innocuous that it is not effective to render abortive an 
attempt to ta.1ce propert)I'- out of the channels of commerce forever, 
leaving the frustration of such attempts to be effected through the 
operation of rules of policy worked out by the courts in their at-
tempts to procure free a1ienability of property. 
-The difficulty here seems to rest largely upon a too literal reading 
of the statutory definition. It is true that Blackacre can be alienated 
unconditionally and in fee, at any time by its present owners. It is 
equally true that every probability is against its being alienated. B 
will almost certainly retain the club he holds over A's head in the 
form of his conditional limitation. It may be because he conceives 
it his duty to stand guard; if not, the ci.rcumstances are such that he 
will almost certainly demand more for a surrender of his rights than 
A will be willing to pay. This of cours.e was understood by the 
grantor in creating the limitation to B, and .by the judges when they 
declared such a limitation void as an improper restraint on alienation. 
In dealing with the statutory test of what constitutes an absolute 
suspension of alienation, or in the words of the statute, a suspension 
of the absolute power of alienation, the courts have proceeded as 
though they were dealing with a statement of abstract truth rather 
than with a rule of policy founded upon economic considerations. 
They have been satisfied with a purely theoretical possibility of 
alienation, and have not concerned themselves with the policy the 
statute was intended to subserve. Had that policy been clearly per-
ceived, it is believed that it would have been seen that it requires 
free alienability by the owner or owners of the present estate and 
02 
"In respect to Rule I, concerning suspension of the absolute power of 
alienation, the main purpose is to confine within specified limits the period 
during which property may be so tied up that it can not come upon the market, 
or cannot be freed from its special character as an 'estate' or 'fund' and re-
stored to the status of ordinary _property owned outright by individuals who 
can sell or spend it." CHAPLIN, SusPtNSION oF '.l'HE POWER oF AI.IF:NATION, 
{2nd ed.], Sec. 21; "The primary purpose of the statute limiting the right to 
alienate realty is not to prevent perpetuities, but to _prevent unduly removing 
-property from the field of business transactions." Becker v. Chester, us 
Wis. go. (Quotation from the syllabus by Marshall, J.) 
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that the absolute power of alienation is suspended, when the owner 
or owners of the present estate can not convey an absolute fee in 
possession. 
The courts are ·perhaps ~ot to be criticised too much for their in-
terpretation of the statutes; for it was an interpretation to which 
the definition of perpetuity upon which the statutes were framed 
were subject. Even under the common law rule, it has been held at 
times that the rule had no application to alienable future interests, 
regardless of their remoteness. 63 
This is due, as has been pointed out; to the fact that such defini-
tions have been carried over from a time when 'perpetuity' was used 
in the sense of an unbarrable entail. It was defined in this way by 
Lord Nottingham in the Duke of Norfolk's Case,6' as previously 
quoted : "A perpetuity is a settlement of an estate or interest in 
tail, with such remainders e~pectant upon it, as are in no sort in 
the power of the tenant in .tail in possession to dock by any recovery 
or assignment." It was defined in the same sense in the slightly 
earlier case of W asliboitrne v. D(Jwnes, 65 where, in determining that 
a tenant o~ an equitable estate tail could bar the entail, it was said, 
"A perpetuity is where, if all that have interest join, and yet can 
not bar qr pass the estate. But if by the concurrence of all having 
the estate tail may be barred, it is no perpetuity." Of course in re-
ferring here to "all that have interest" only those interested in the 
present estate were intended to be referred to. Yet it has been 
understood in the wider sense of including those having future as 
well as those having present interests. Even Saunders, writing be-
fore the adoption of the New York Revision, so understood it, and 
therefore insisted that it was wrong.68 But unfortunately others 
who understood it in the same sense failed to see t.liat, so understood, 
it was wrong. Among these have been the interpreters . of the 
statutes against suspension of the power of alienation. In general, 
.. GRAY, Rux.t AGAINST Pt!!P£TUITI£S, Ch. VII. 
"3 Ch. ·cas. I. 
" l Ch. Cas. 213 • 
.. He says: "It is said in the case of Washliourne v. Downes, l Cha. Ca. 
23, 213, that, 'A perpetuity is where, if all that have interest join, yet they can 
not bar or pass the estate;' and in the case of Scattergood v. Edge, I Salk. 
229, that 'every executory devise is a perpetuity so far as it goes; i. e. an 
estate inalienable though all mankind join in the conveyance.' But these 
definitions of a perpetuity are not accurate. If an estate be limited to the 
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it has been assumed by those interpreting those statutes that they 
express the common law as it stood at the time they were first adopt-
ed, and that the common law was satisfied if all having interests 
could convey. Thus in Becker v. Chester, Marshall, J., said, "Note 
the complete harmony between the language of W ashboitrne v. 
Downes and the statute: "A perpetuity is where, if all that have 
interest join, and yet can not bar or pass the estate. But if by the 
concurrence of all having the estate tail may be barred, it is no per-
petuity." "Such power of alienation is suspended when there are no 
persons in being by whom an absolute fee in possession can be 
conveyed."61 
To the general view that the rule laid down by the New York 
Revised Statutes is against suspension of alienation only, there was 
among writers and courts little dissent prior to the year r89r. In 
that year appeared a book by Mr. Stewart, CHAPLIN ON SusPENSION 
oF THE PowER OF ALIENATION.68 In ·this work the view was ad-
vanced that the Revised Statutes laid down two rules, one against 
the suspension of the absolute power of alienation, the other against 
remoteness of vesting. The fact that Mr. Chaplin's views have 
gained recognition in the Court of Appeals of New York gives them 
great significance. To make clear his position and the writer's com-
ments upon it, it is necessary to quote the relevant sections of the 
New York Revised Statutes :69 
"Sec. 7. Estates, as respects the time of their enjoyment, are 
divided into estates in possession, ap.d estates in expectancy. 
Sec. 8. An estate in possession, is where the owner has an imme-
use of A and his heirs, but if B should die without heirs of his body, then to 
the use of C and his heirs, the limitation to C and his heirs would be void, 
as tending to a perpetuity. Yet C might, no doubt, release or pass his future 
estate; and with the concurrence of the necessary parties, the fee-simple might 
be disposed of, before there was a failure of issue of B. A perpetuity may, 
with greater propriety, be defined to be a future limitation, restraining the 
owner of the estate from aliening the fee-simple of the property, discharged 
of such future use or estate, before the event is determined, or the period 
arrived, when such future use or estate is to arise. If that event or period 
be within the bounds prescribed by law, it is not a perpetuity." SANDERS, 
EssAY ON UsitS AND TR.usTs, [4th ed.], vol. I, p. 1g6. 
01 II5 Wis. 90, 109. 
18 A second edition appeared in 1911 • 
.. The sections quoted are from Part II, Ch. I, Art. I. 
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qiate right to the possession of the land. An estate. in expectancy, is 
where the right to possession is postponed to a future period. 
Sec. 9. Estates in expectancy, are divided into, 
·I. Estates commencing at a future day, denominated futur~ 
estates; anci,. 
2. Reversions. 
Sec. 10. A future estate, is an estate limited to commence in pos-
session at a future day, either without the intervention of a precedent 
estate, or on the determination, by lapse of time or otherwise, of a 
precedent estate, created at the same time. 
Sec. II. Where a future estate is dependent on a precedent estate, 
it may be termed a remainder, and may be created and transferred 
by that name. 
Sec. 12. A reversion is the residue of an estate left in the grantor 
or his heirs, or in the heirs of a testator, commencing in possession 
on the determination of a particular estate granted or devised. 
Sec. 13. Future estates are either vested or contingent. They are 
vested, when there is a· person in being, who would have an imme-
diate right to the possession of the lands, upon the ceasing of the 
intermediate or precedent estate. They are contingent, whilst the 
person to whom, or the event upon which they are limited to take 
effect; remains uncertain. 
Sec. 14. Ever] future estate shall be void in its creation, which 
shall suspend the absolute power of alienation for a longer period 
than is prescribed in this Article. Such power of alienation is sus~ 
pended, when there are no persons in being, by whom an absolute 
fee in possession can be conveyed. 
Sec. 15. The absolute power of alienation, shall not be suspended 
by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than 
during the continuance of not more than two lives in being at the 
creation of the estate, except in the single case mentioned in the next 
section. 
Sec. 16. A contingent remainder in fee, may be created on a prior 
remainder in fee, to take effect in the event that the persons to whom 
the first remainder is limited, shall die under the age of twenty-one 
years, or upon any other contingency, by which the estate of such 
persons may be determined before they attain their full age. 
S~c. 17. Successive estates for life shall not be limited, unless to 
persons in being at the creation thereof; and where a remainder shall 
be limited on more than tw<> successive estates for life, all the life 
estates subsequent to those of the two persons first entitled thereto, 
shall be void, and upon the death e>f those persons, the remainder 
shall take effect, in the same manner as if no other life estates had 
been created. 
Sec. 18. N <> remainder shall be created upon an estate for the 
life of any e>ther person or persons than the grantee or devisee of 
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such estate, unless such remainder be in fee; nor shall a remainder 
be created upon ,such an estate in a term for years, unless it be for 
the whole residue of such term. 
Sec. 19. When a remainder shall be created upon any such life 
estate, and more than two persons shall be named, as the persons 
during whose lives the life estate shall continue, the remainder shall 
take effect upon the death of the two persons first named, in the 
same manner as if no other lives had been introduced. 
Sec. 20. A contingent remainder shall not be created on a term 
of years, unless the nature of the contingency on wliich it is limited, 
be such that the remainder must vest in interest, during the con-
~uance of not more than two lives in being at the creation of such 
remainder, or upon the termination thereof. 
Sec. 21. No estate for life, shall be limited as a remainder on a 
term of years, except to a person in being, at the creation of such 
estate. 
Sec. 22. Where a remainder shall be limited to take effect on the 
death of any person without heirs, or heirs of his body, or without 
issue, the words "heirs" or "issue," shall be construed to mean heirs 
or issue, living at the death of the person named as ancestor. 
Sec. 23. All the provisions contained in this Article, relative to 
{uture estates, shall be construed to apply to limitations of chattels 
real as well as of freehold estates, so that the absolute ownership of 
a term of years, shall not be suspended for a longer period than the 
absolute power of alienatiop can be suspended, in respect to a fee. 
Sec. 24- Subject to the rules established in the preceding sections 
of this Article, a freehold estate as well as a chattel real, may be 
created, to commence at a future day; an estate for life may be 
created, in a term of years, and a remainder limited thereon; a re-
mainder of a freehold or chattel real, either contingent or vested, 
may be created expectant on the determination of a term of years; 
and a fee may be limited on a fee, upon a contingency, which, if it 
should occur, must happen within the period prescribed in this 
Article. 
Sec. 25. Two or more future estates, may also be created, to take 
effect in the alternative, so that if the first in order shall fail to vest, 
the next in succession shall be substituted for it, and take effect 
accordingly. 
Sec. 26. No future estate, otherwise valid, shall be void on the 
ground of the probability or improbability of the contingency on 
which it is limited to take effect. 
Sec. 27. A remainder may be limited on a contingency, which, in 
case it should happen, will operate to abridge or determine the pre-
cedent estate; and every suc::h remainder shall be construed a condi-
tional limitation, and shall have the same effect as such a limitation 
would have by law." 
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Mr. Chaplin accepted the usual interpretation of sections 14 and 
15, i. e., that they prohibit only a suspension of the absolute power 
of alienatiqn and contain no prohibition against remoteness of vest-
ing. 70 But he contended that as to 'remainders' the sections imme-
diately succeeding those named together with section 16 established a 
second rule, one against remoteness of vesting beyond the statutory 
period. 
For the purpose of examining the application of the rule against 
remoteness of vesting, called by him Rule II, he divided 'remainders' 
into three classes, according as they were limited upon estates for 
years, for life, or in fee.71 He found the source of his rule as ap-
plied to 'remainders' limited upon estates for years in sections 24 
and 20 ;72 as applied to 'remainders' limited upon estates for lives in 
sections 17, 18, and 19 ;73 and as applied to 'remainders' limited on 
a fee, in sections 24 and 16.74 
To the mind of the writer there is nothing in the form of the Re-
vised Statutes, nor in the notes of the revisers, to justify this deriva-
tion of a rule against remoteness of vesting. Referring to the sec-
tions quoted above, it seems clear that they naturally arrange them-
selves into three groups. Sections 7 to 13 inclusive are definitive in 
nature; sections 14 to 23 inclusive are restrictive; while sections 24 
to 27 inclusive are permissive. Sections 14, 15, and 16 were in-
tended to lay down a narrower rule against perpetuities than the 
common law rule. Sections 14 and 15 restricted the common law 
limit of 'lives in being' to 'two lives in being.' Section 16 though 
permissive in form was intended also in a restrictive sense as it was 
intended to limit the period of twenty years to the case of an actual 
infancy. Sections 18 to 21 inclusive were intended to subject the 
creation of specified future estates, some of which were not within 
the prohibition of the common law rule, nor of the statutory rule,711 
to r~strictions not existing at common law. These were in further-
"SusPSNSlON oF THI:: Pown o:F ALISNATION, Secs. 62-6.s. 
n Ibid, Sec. 318. 
n Ibid, Sec. 319. 
n Ibid, Secs. 320-322. 
"Ibid, Secs. 338-340. Criticism of the views presented by Mr. Chaplin 
may be found in an article by Mr. George F. Canfield, "The New York Re-
Tised Statutes and the Rule against Perpetuities," I Cor.. L. Rr:v. 224, 228. 
" See particularly sections 17, 18, 19. and 21, where, under certain condi-
tions, the creation of vested future estates is prohibited. 
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ance of the general principle that the power of imposing restrictions 
<>n the alienability of the fee by the creation of future estates should 
be curtailed more than it had been at common faw. Section 23 sub-
jected chattels rea1 to the provisions of the article in which the sec-
tions quoted are found, i. e., the article on the Creation and Division 
of Estates. 
Having imposed by these sections restrictions on the creation of 
future· estates 1n favor .of public welfare, the revisers then sought l:o 
abolish other restrictions previously existing not required by any 
ntle of public policy, but restilting from technical rules of ..the com-
mon law, or at least to make clear that they no longer existed.75 
Naturally they intended that the privileges thus granted or secured 
should be subject to the restrictions ,Previously imposed and they. 
sometimes specifically so provided.TT Thus in section 24 after pro-
viding that a fee might be limited on a fee, on a contingency, they 
added "which, if it should occur, must happen within the period 
prescribed in this Article." 
It has been generally agreed or assumed that the qualification 
added nothing in legal effect; that it only made express what would 
otherwise have been implied. Still it does provide that the contin-
gency upon which the second fee may be limited must occur within 
the statutory period. This is in form a prohibition against remote-
ness of vesting. How can this be reconciled with the view that the 
.statutory rule applies only to inalienable rather than to contingent 
"Thus the following technical rules of the common law were expressly 
abrogated by section 24; a freehold could not be limited to commence in the 
future. TIFFANY, RsAr. PROPERTY, Sec. II9; Buckler v. Hardy, Cro. Eliz. 585. 
An estate for life could not be created in a term of years and a remainder 
limited thereon. GRAY, PERPETUITIES, Secs. 71a, 807, 808. A contingent re-
mainder could not be created expectant upon a term of years. TIFFANY, RsAr. 
PROPERTY, Sec. 123; CHAI.US, Rl;:Ar, PROPERTY, 93. A fee could not be limited 
in derogation of a previously granted fee. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, Sec. ug. 
n Section 17 provides that when a contingent remainder is limited on a 
term of years it must vest in interest within :two lives. To the mind of the 
writer such a case would have been covered by sections 14 and 15, had those 
sections been construed as intended by the revisers, and such section was, 
therefore, from their point of view, superfluous. But contingent remainders 
could not be created on terms of years, at common law. The Revisers pro-
posed to allow them to be so created, sec. 24- It was, therefore, natural that 
they should specifically subject them to the rules applicable to· contingent re-
mainders generally. . · 
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i~terests? Those who adopt the view that the statutes provide a 
rule against suspension of alienation only, such rule being found in 
sections 14 to 16, either pass this provision over without comment 
·or assume.that it refers merely to statutory rule as so understood.78 
To the writer, who believes that sections 14 to 16 were intended to 
lay down a rule against remoteness of vesting, it seems clear that 
the provision merely refers t<;> the rule as intended to be established 
by those sections. Mr. Chaplin however argued, as stated above, 
that this provision was intended to establish a rule against remote-
ness of vesting of 'remainders' limited upon a fee, and with the other 
sections, referred to above, relied upon by him established a general 
rule against remoteness of 'remainders.' 
Mr. Chaplin's rule against remoteness extended only to 're-
mainders'. This means remainders in the statutory sense, not in 
the common law sense. Now remainders are nowhere defined in 
the Revised . Statutes. This in itself is suggestive of the view that 
the revisers did not intend anything to tum on the question whether 
a certain future estate was or was not a remainder. However, they 
used the term 'remainder' frequently in the statutes. And in sec-
tion l l they provided : "Where a future estate is dependent on a 
precedent estate, it may be termed a remainder, and may be created 
and transferred by that name." It is apparent that, as so used, the 
term "remainder" comprehends what were previously known as 
vested remainders, ~ontingent remainders, shifting uses, and also 
executory devises where, at least, the latter were limited in defeas-
ance of another estate created by the same will. This leaves, of the 
future estates as defined by the statutes, only what were previously 
called springing uses and possibly such executory devises as are not 
limited in defeasance of another estate limited by the same instru-
ment. If 'remainder' as used in Mr. Chaplin's rule is to have the 
same meaning as that here suggested, we have the absurdity of a 
rule against the remoteness of vesting of shifting uses without hay-
ing a similar rule with respect to springing uses. This, apparently, 
••FOWLER, REAI. PRoPI>RTY, 282; Rttws, ~AI. PRO~'l'Y, 622, n. a. See 
George F. Canfield, "The New York Revised Statutes," 1 Cox.. L. J. 224, 300, 
where the writer says that it would seem that the statute should be inter-
preted as though it read, "A fee may be limited upon a fee provided that it 
does not occasion a suspension of the power of alienation beyond the period 
prescribed in this article." See also instructive comment by Professor Ed-
ward H. Warren, 30 CYc. 1518, n. 81. · 
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led to the suggestion by Mr. Chaplin in the second edition of his 
book that perhaps eventually the courts would apply this rule to all 
future estates, either by analogy to the rule with respect to re-
mainders or by so construing the statutes as to read 'remainders' as 
synonymous with 'future estates'.79 · 
In the Matter of Wilcox8° the Court of Appeals of New York 
accepted Mr. Chaplin's .view. In that case personal property was 
limited over upon an event that might occur at a more remote time 
than two lives in being. The interest so limited was at all times 
alienable. The New York statutes provide: "The absolute owner-
ship of personal property shall not be suspended by any limitation 
or condition whatever, for a longer period than during the con-
tinuance and until the termination of not more than two lives in 
being at the date of the instrument containing such limitation or 
condition; or if such instrument be a will, for not more than two 
lives in being at the death of the testator.81 
"In all other respects, limitations of future or contingent interests 
in personal property shall he subject to the rules prescribed in the 
first Chapter of this Act, in relation to future estates in land."82 
The court held that, in determining whether or not an alienable 
executory limitation in personal property suspended the absolute 
ownership of personal property, it was necessary, in view of the 
above statute, to determine whether or not the statutes contained a 
rule against remoteness of vesting, as, "if it were established that 
the sole statutory restriction on the power to create estates in realty 
was that the creation of such estates shall not suspend the absolute 
powers of alienation beyond the prescribed period, there would be 
force in the position that the absolute ownership of personal property 
was not suspended when there were persons in being, no matter in 
what manner or what the nature of their interests, who acting con-
jointly could transfe: an indefeasible title."83 
It determined that there was to be found in the statutes relating 
to real estate a rule against remoteness of vesting. The argument 
of the court is as follows: The common law rule was a rule against 
,. SusPENSION oF AutNATION, [2nd: ed.], Secs. 304-305. 
,,, 194 N. Y. 288. 
81 Ri::v. ST., Part II, Ch. IV, Title IV, sec. I. 
"'Rev. ST., Pt. II, Ch. IV, ~it. IV, sec. 2. 
83 194 N. Y. 288, 300. 
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remoteness. The statutory ruJe found in sections I4 and IS is a 
rule against suspension only. The revisers were men of great 
erudition, and it must be supposed that they understood the common 
law rule, and, therefore, knew that sections I4 and IS established 
a different rule. Section I7 prohibiting the creation of successive 
life estates to more than two persons in being showed that, at least 
in this respect,_ limitations on the power to create future estates 
other than the provision that they should not suspend the power of 
alienation were intended. 
Sections IS to 24 inclusive with their elaborate and minute re-
strictio!ls on the creation of remainders were impossible to under-
stand if the revisers intended to establish the smgle rule that the 
power of alienation should not be suspended for more than two 
lives in being. Particularly is this true of Section 24. The court 
says: "Section 24, already quoted, concludes, 'and a fee may be 
limited on a fee, upon a contingency, which, if it should occur, must 
happen within the period prescribed in this Article,' i. e. within two 
lives in being. This statutory authority for lirriJting a fee upon a 
fee is necessarily exclusive; othenvise, why should the statute de-
clare that the contingency must occur within the specified period? 
It has no necessary connection with the provision restricting the 
suspension of the power of alienation. It is u~der this provision 
that the present case would fall if it were real estate."8 i 
The case of Matter of Wilco% is obviously revolutionary.85 The 
rule against suspension of alienation had varied from the common 
law Rule against Perpetuities in two significant respects. It forbade 
the creation of inalienable present estates, where such inalienability 
might exceed two lives in being, while it permitted the creation of 
alienable contingent future estates at however remote a period they 
might vest. Matter of Wilco% now establishes a. rule against the 
remoteness of vesting of 'remainders' even though alienable, which, 
because of the limit to two lives in being, is more stringent than the 
common law rule. 
The rule laid down in Matter of Wilco% has been followed re-
cently by the New York Court of Appeals and applied to a future 
estate which can not be called a 'remainder' except as 'remainder' 
"194 N. Y. 288, -299. 
85 See case commented on in Fowr.~s ReAL PROP.£R'tY LAW, [3rd ed.], 
276-289; 22 HARV. L. ~v. 543; 9 Cor,. L. ~v. 368. 
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may be construed to include all future estates. The case ref erred 
to is Walker v. Marcellus & Otisco Lake Railway Co.88 In this 
case the grantor. conveyed, in effect, as construed, an estate in fee 
to take effect whenever she, the grantor, should cease to occupy a 
certain lime kiln upon the premises, and to use the same .for the 
purpose of burning lime. She had ceased to use the lime kiln, and 
the assignee of the grantee being in possession sought to hold pos-
session by virtue of the limitation in the deed.87 The court repeated 
the substance of the argument of Matter of Wilcoz as follows: 
"The revisers, however, had something more in mind at 
least with regard to certain future estates than merely the 
prohibition of restrictions on alienation. As an illustration 
a remainder might not be limited on more than two successive 
life estates. They well knew that every executory device or 
springing use was then required to be so limited that the con-
tingency upon which they depended must happen within a 
time measured by lives. They were aware of the definition 
of a springing use; that-it depended on no prior estate. Yet 
they intended to cover the entire ground as to the creation 
and division of estates. Their design was to simplify, not to 
complicate, the transfer of real estate-to restrict, not to 
extend, the limitations which a grantor might impose upon it. 
With all this in mind they provided that a freehold estate 
might be created to commence at a future day and that a 
fee may be limited on a fee on a contingency which must 
occur, if ever, within a time measured by lives."88 
It then proceeded to deny the validity of any distinction between 
"remainders" and other future estates respecting the question of 
remoteness of vesting in the following language: 
"Technically a springing use, or what is now its equiva-
lent, does not come withi!l this definition. It does come with-
in its object and purpose. Had the determinable fee been 
.. 226 N. Y. 347. 
87 The facts were that the original grantee had entered upon the land be-
fore the assignment and destroyed the kiln. The court below held that the 
grantee or its assigns could not take advantage of a discontinuance of use 
caused by the grantee itself. 179 App. Div. (N. Y.) j13. · 
83 226 N. Y. 349. 
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granted, not excepted, no question would arise. It is incon-
ceivable that the revisers intended to make a distinttion be-
tween t~vo classes of cases, the effect of which is substantially 
ideu'tical. It must be that in speaking of a fee limited on a 
fee they had not in mind the technical distinction of the early 
conveyancers. They were considering future estates and 
their desire was that when such estates depended upon a con-
tingency they should vest in possession within a reasonable 
period. Their language should, therefore, be so construed as 
to carry out their intention. When they speak of a fee 
limited on a fee in this connection they refer to the grant of 
any future fee which may arise on a contingency which limits 
a prior fee however such result is brought about."8 Q 
That the views taken by the New York court in these cases will 
be followed by those states which have adopted the New York Real 
Property Code seems hardly likely, yet seems no more unlikely than 
that New York would do so seemed a few years ago. Some of the 
statutory provisions especially relied upon by the New York court 
are, however, not found in all of such states, so there is to this ex-
tent less reason to be found by them for adopting the New York 
rule against remoteness.90 
Under the law as it now stands in New York, assuming that the 
cases referred to represent the present state of the law, the effect is 
to render the statute prohibiting a suspension of the power of aliena-
tion chiefly effective in invalidating trusts, which in tum have been 
.. 2z6 N. Y. 350. 
"'This is particularly true of that part of section 24 of the New York 
Revised Statutes especially relied upon in the Matter of \Vilcox, i. e., the 
provision that, "a fee may be limited on a fee, on a contingency, which, if it 
should occur must happen within the period prescribed in this article." This 
provision appears in the section corresponding to section 24 of the New York 
Revised Statutes in the states of California (CIVIL Cone, Sec. 773), Montana 
(I REVISED ConEs, Sec. 4493), North Dakota, (I COMPILED LAWS, Sec. 5316), 
and South Dakota (CIVIL Cone, Sec. 253). It has been omitted from the 
corresponding sections in the states of Arizona (CIVIL Cons, Sec. 4689), In-
diana (2 BunN's ANN. STS., Sec. 3995), Michigan (COMPILED LAWS, Sec. II, 
542), !\iinnesota, (GENERAL STATUTES, Sec. 6674), and \Visconsin (\V1scoNSIN 
STATUTES, Sec. 2048), while Oklahoma (GENERAL STATUTES, Sec. 5437), omits 
that part requiring that the contingency, "if it should occur, must happen 
within the period prescribed in this Article." 
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made inalienable by statute. It is to be hoped that if in other juris-
dictions we are to have a rule against remoteness- of vesting from 
the statutes, it will be found in sections prohibiting suspension of 
the power of alienation rather than in the sections relied upon by the 
New York courts, and, if so found, that it will be determined that 
it is the only rule to be found in the statutes. 
Or.IVER S. RuNm:r.r.. 
University of Wisconsin Law School. 
